Manau paprasčiau urano nusipirkti iš Teroristų rusų, arba iš Kuilio. O kokiu būdu uraną prisodrina Š. Korėja ? Bei neįkertu kodėl jiems draudžia vystyt atominę bombą ? Korėja, Rusija, Pakistanas irgi neitin patikimų piliečių respublikos, bet va turi tokį ginklą ir niekas nekimba (išskyrus š.korėją)

Greičiau pasigamins, greičiau visi atšoks, nes kieki pulti neatomines valstybes. Mato Iranas, kas nutinka atominio ginklo neturinčiom arba jo atsisakiusiom valstybėm, kai JAV sugalvoja demokratiją atnešti.

Selektyviai pateikta informacija:
Industry data shows that more than half of the effort needed to enrich uranium to 90% is spent getting from 0.7% to 4%. When enrichment reaches 20%, the threshold for what counts as “highly enriched uranium”, and a level Iran has produced at Natanz in the past, about 90% of the work towards weapons-grade uranium is done.
The process gets easier because less material has to be moved around at higher levels of enrichment. A plant that enriches uranium to 4% with 5,000 centrifuges may need only 1,500 to reach 20% enrichment. From there, several hundred centrifuges are sufficient to reach the 90% needed for a nuclear bomb. Use 5,000 throughout and the rate of enrichment accelerates dramatically.
“It’s really hard at the start because you have very, very little of the uranium isotope you want. Natural uranium is almost all U-238 and initially getting that little bit of U-235 out is really difficult. But the more refined you make it the faster the refinement process happens,” said Anne Harrington, a lecturer in international relations at Cardiff University.

Šaltinis: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/ ... -explained